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The maxim, "N emno tenetur se!psum accusare," by its incorpora-
tion into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution has become
one of the foundations of our liberty. A mere rule of evidence
in England, it is here made a part of the fundamental law, and,
so far as we know, is embodied in every State Constitution as
well. Its object plainly is to protect the witness himself and no
one else, and the compulsion against which he is protected is
both physical and mental duress. Many of the States, and Con-
gress also, have passed statutes having for their object the com-
pelling of witnesses to testify even when their testimony would
tend to incriminate themselves, by offering them immunity
therefor. But these statutes, to be upheld, must be as broad as
the Constitutional provision which they seek to supplant and
must give absolute indemnity, so that the witness can never be
prosecuted for the crime which he may disclose or which his tes-
timony may be the means of discovering. The compulsion of
these statutes has been strenuously resisted by those whom it
was sought to compel to testify thereunder, by demanding the
protection of the Fifth Amendment. Especially numerous have
been the controversies arising out of attempts to secure the pro-
tection of this amendment against the ptovisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Law. The case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U. S. 547, decided that the immunity offered by Revised
Statutes, Section 86o, was insufficient and that the witness could
not be compelled to speak. This was probably the cause of an
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act pass .d in 1893 to
effect the same object, which was sustained in Brown v. Walker,
x6I U. S. 591 (four judges dissenting) as giving complete
immunity.
The proceedings before pension examiners under Revised
Statutes, Section 4744, are almost completely analogous to the
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, except
that no amendment giving complete immunity has been adopted
and Revised Statutes, Section 86o, still applies; but they have
not been challenged and investigated as fully, probably because
of the differences between the two classes of citizens examined.
For this reason the case of United States v. Bell, 8x Fed. Rep. 830,
becomes very interesting. Bell, an ignorant negro, had by the
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laxity of our laws, been admitted to the bar and made a Notary
Public, and, acting in this capacity, had perpetrated certain
frauds on the Pension Bureau, consisting in the fraudulent
issuing of certain vouchers and the affixing of his notarial seal
to a false affidavit. He was compelled by the pension examiner
to come before him for examination, although no gubpoena was
issued for him, and was then interrogated about the execution
of these documents, without being told by the examiner that he
had the right to remain silent on any matter that would tend to
incriminate him. As was natural for an ignorant negro, who
had probably never heard of this constitutional provision, was
unaware of his rights in the matter, and was not peirmitted by
the examiner to consult counsel, he swore falsely and the report
containing his answers was afterwards introduced in evidence
against him on a prosecution for perjury.
All these statutes which seek to compel a witness's testimony
by offering him immunity therefor, contain a proviso that no
person shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying. Of course, if the immunity
offered is as broad as the Constitutional provision, the witness
may be compelled to answer and as a corollary may be indicted
for perjury if he swears falsely. But Counselman's case settled
it that the immunity offered by Revised Statutes, Section 86o, is
not as broad as the Constitutional guaranty, and therefore Bell
was not compelled to answer. Whether this proviso that the
witness shall not be protected against prosecution for perjury
committed during the examination itself is consistent with the
protection of the Fifth Amendment has never been decided, and
the court here expressly refused to decide the point, holding that
the fact that the examination was taken under compulsion and
that the witness was ignorant of his rights and was not warned
of his privilege alone made the record inadmissible. The wit-
ness did not waive his privilege, as he did not knowingly and
understandingly abandon it, and the examination was almost
purely inquisitorial, as no sufficient safeguards against self-
incriminating testimony were thrown around him.
Within the last few years several of the States have passed laws
regulating the sale of "convict made" goods. Two of the
largest, New York and Ohio, passed in 1894 such laws differing
from each other in no essential particular. The Supreme Court
of Ohio in Arnold v. Yander, 47 N. E. Rep. 5o, has recently de-
clared the law of that State to be unconstitutional, as conflicting
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with Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution-the
Interstate Commerce clause. It was made unlawful for any
person to expose for sale in Ohio any convict-made goods without
first obtaining from the Secretary of -State a license; but
the act especially provided that it should not affect the pro-
ducts of the prisons of the State of Ohio. In Mobile Co. v. Kim-
ball, 102 U. S. 69x, 702, commerce is defined as consisting in "in-
tercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, and
the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well
as the purchase, sale and'exchange of commodities." No State
Legislature, only Congress, can declare that convict-made goods
are not articles of commerce and then discriminate against them
or exclude them from the State by unfriendly legislation. And
since Leloup v. Port of Mobile, I27 U. S. 640, the license fee is a
tax upon goods imported from another State and therefore an
illegal interference with interstate commerce.
The New York law has not yet been passed upon by its
courts, but when the time comes, the same conclusion cannot
fail to be reached by them. In People v Rawkins, 85 Hun. 43, a
kindred law providing that no convict-made goods of other
States can be offered for sale in New York State without the
label "convict made," was held unconstitutional on the same
grounds as above.
